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Abstract
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting
game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose
between fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top
of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value
is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sort-
ing takes place with weaker and more loss averse players fleeing before others
fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for
the key theoretical predictions, and document suboptimal predatory fighting.
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1 Introduction
Following Maynard Smith’s (1974) seminal contribution, competition for a prize
is often modeled as the war of attrition. In this game, players choose the time at
which they intend to flee. Time is costly, and players may differ in their opportunity
costs. The player who waits the longest wins the prize and both players pay a cost
proportional to the time it takes for the losing player to flee. Maynard Smith (1974)
refers to this type of interaction as a “display”. In a display, no physical contact
takes place, or if it does, it does not settle the battle or convey information about
which player would win an escalated conflict.
In this paper, we augment the war of attrition with the option to fight. At the
start of the game, players are privately informed of their strength. At any moment,
a player does not only choose between fleeing and waiting, but also has the option
to actively start a fight. In case of fight, a battle ensues and the stronger player wins
the prize while the losing player incurs a loss. This dynamic Fight-or-Flight game
allows us to make sense of a wide variety of competitions. It captures the essence of
many types of interactions in which the timing of actions plays a crucial role, such
as R&D races, litigation, the launch of political or advertisement campaigns, and
firm acquisitions. It also fits situations in the animal kingdom, where animals fight
over territory or prey. In all these examples, players can ’flee’ (e.g., reduce R&D
spending, settle), wait to see if the other gives in, or initiate a fight (e.g., suing the
opponent, start a hostile takeover), forcing the other into a battle.
The augmented game helps to understand why in some situations players want
to wait and see if the other flees without a battle, while in other circumstances both
want to act as quickly as possible. To illustrate the former type of situation, consider
two political candidates who may wait a long time before they officially announce
that they are running for office. If they act too early, they give their opponent time
to prepare a counter-campaign. In other instances, players want to act as quickly as
possible. A firm that wants to expand its market by acquiring a competitor should
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act quickly, to prevent the prospective target from selling its assets.
Notice that both types of examples are not well described by the war of attrition.
In the first type of example it may happen that players fight after a waiting period
which is not a possibility in the war of attrition. The war of attrition also does
not capture the essence of the second type of interaction. In particular, the war of
attrition does not accommodate that strong players decide to fight in a split-second.
In this paper, we analyze the Fight-or-Flight game theoretically and experimen-
tally. Theoretically, we identify a key-parameter, the ”deterrence value”, that deter-
mines how the competition between two players will unfold. The deterrence value
is the amount that a player earns on top of the prize if the other player manages
to escape. Our theoretical analysis based on standard preferences yields two main
insights. First, if the deterrence value is negative all player types will rush and act
in a split-second. If the deterrence value is positive, players prefer to avoid the
costly fight and wait before they act. The second insight is that if the deterrence
value is positive but not too large, sorting will occur in the dynamic Fight-or-Flight
game. That is, the weakest players will flee just before the end. Thus, the dynamic
structure helps players to avoid costly fights, in comparison to a static version of the
game that is stripped of its time element. If, on the other hand, the deterrence value
is large, all player types will wait until the end before they flee or fight.
We also investigate what happens in a behavioral model in which players are
allowed to differ in the extent to which they are loss averse. This model yields two
additional testable implications. First, it predicts that sorting will occur in a wider
set of circumstances than in the standard model. Second, it predicts that the more
loss averse players flee more frequently before the end.
We test the predictions in an experiment in which we systematically vary the
deterrence value and the dynamic/static nature of the game between treatments.
Our experimental findings support some of the key features of the theory. With a
negative deterrence value subjects quickly learn to decide in a split-second. With
a positive deterrence value, subjects tend to wait much longer and indeed use time
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to sort. In agreement with the model of heterogeneous loss aversion, we find that
endogenous timing reduces the likelihood of costly battles in a wider set of circum-
stances than predicted by standard theory. Subjects who are classified as more loss
averse on the basis of an independent task are indeed the ones that tend to flee
more often early in the game. There is also an interesting finding that deviates from
the predictions. With a positive deterrence value, a sizable minority of the subjects
continues to fight early, even after ample time to learn how to play the game. This
finding is in stark contrast with some behavioral findings in related dynamic games.
For instance, Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker (1988) report that the deadline ef-
fect, a striking concentration of agreements in the final seconds of the game, is the
most robust behavioral finding in a class of games designed to test axiomatic mod-
els of Nash bargaining. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006)
identify substantial last-minute bidding in second-price auctions. They attribute
this phenomenon of sniping to both strategic and naı̈ve considerations of the bid-
ders. We discuss some potential explanations for the anomaly of early fighting in
our contest game at the end of the results section.
Our paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games in which players
compete for a prize. Several studies compare dynamic with static environments.
Hörisch and Kirchkamp (2010) investigate how experimental subjects behave in
static and dynamic versions of the war of attrition and some closely related games.
Theoretically, the dynamic version of a war of attrition does not help players to
sort, and indeed, the authors do not observe such a difference in their experiments.1
1There is a large literature on static contest games. Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) study a contest
game that is quite close to our static benchmark. They find that subjects compromise more often
than in equilibrium, and they discuss some explanations based on cognitive limitations. Oprea,
Wilson, and Zillante (2013) experimentally study war of attrition games with two-sided private in-
formation (as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)) and observe behavior close to theoretical predictions.
De Dreu et al. (2016) investigate a game in which a group of attackers competes with a group of
defenders. They find that in-group defense is stronger and better coordinated than out-group ag-
gression. Oprea, Henwood, and Friedman (2011) show how the matching protocol affects outcomes
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Theoretically, in an auction with symmetric interdependent valuations, Goeree and
Offerman (2003) do not find that the efficiency of a dynamic English auction is im-
proved compared to the static second-price auction. In contrast, Kirchkamp and
Moldovanu (2004) investigate a setup where a bidder’s value is determined by his
own signal in combination with the signal of his right neighbor. In this setting,
bidders can retrieve valuable information in a dynamic auction process. In an ex-
periment, Kirchkamp and Moldovanu find that the efficiency of the English auction
is higher than the efficiency of a second-price auction in which no such information
can be retrieved, which accords with theory.2
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 in-
troduces the Fight-or-Flight game and presents the theory. Section 3 discusses the
experimental design and procedures. Section 4 provides the experimental results
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Dynamic Fight-or-Flight game
Basic setup. We start by describing the dynamic version of the Fight-or-Flight game.
In this section, we present a basic version of the game. In section 2.3 we discuss
several extensions.
in continuous time Hawk-Dove games. Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2015) provide a sur-
vey of the experimental literature on contest games.
2More generally, the study of dynamic games reveals novel insights that significantly surpass
what we know from the study of static games. Recent contributions include Potters, Sefton, and
Vesterlund (2005), Levin and Peck (2008), Ivanov, Levin, and Peck (2009), Kolb (2015) and Agranov
and Elliott (2017). The recent experimental literature on continuous time experiments shows that
outcomes in continuous time may substantially differ from outcomes in discrete time (Friedman &
Oprea, 2012; Oprea, Charness, & Friedman, 2014; Bigoni, Casari, Skrzypacz, & Spagnolo, 2015;
Calford & Oprea, 2017).
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Time is discrete, with a finite number of periods t = 0,1, ...,T . Two players inde-
pendently decide in which period to take an action, where the action can be fight
(F) or flee (R, for ”retreat”). At the start, each player i is privately informed of her
fighting ability ai . It is common knowledge that ai is independently drawn from a
uniform distribution over the unit interval. A player’s strategy lists for every ability
the number of periods in which she chooses to wait and her choice if play reaches
the period in which she wants to act. A player type’s strategy s(ai) is described as
(t,A), where A = {F,R}. This means that player i with ability ai will choose action A
(fight or flee) in period t if the other player did not fight or flee earlier.
The game ends as soon as one of the players decides to fight or flee. The outcome
can be a battle or an escape. A battle occurs if the player with the shortest waiting
time chooses to fight or if they both choose to fight at the same time. An escape
occurs if the player with the shortest waiting time chooses to flee or if they both
choose to flee at the same time. If one of the players chooses to fight and the other
chooses to flee at the same time, an escape occurs with probability p and a battle
with probability 1− p.
Payoffs. In case of a battle, the player with the higher ability receives vh > 0 (the
prize) and the player with the lower ability earns −vl , where vh,vl > 0. In case of
an escape, the player who chose to flee earns 0 while the other earns vh + k, the
prize plus a deterrence payoff k. This deterrence value can be positive or negative. A
positive deterrence value captures situations where fighting is costly, so that players
prefer to get the prize without fighting for it. A negative deterrence value captures
situations in which beating the other generates value and letting the other escape
is costly. We restrict the analysis to k > −vh, so that letting the other escape always
gives a higher payoff than escaping. As tie breaking rules, we assume that if there
is a battle between equally strong players, it is randomly determined which player
receives vh and which player receives −vl . If both players decided to flee at the same
time, it is randomly determined who earns 0 and who earns vh + k. Alternatively,
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players could be allowed to share the prize equally in case that they both flee. This
would not affect the theoretical analysis.
We assume that players maximize their expected utility. We allow for the possi-
bility that players are loss averse. To keep the model parsimonious, we assume that
the reflection point is located at 0 and that each player’s utility function is piecewise
linear in the payoff x and given by:
U (x) =

x if x ≥ 0
λx if x < 0
(1)
Here, λ ≥ 1 measures the degree of loss aversion.
2.2 Equilibrium
We look for pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. In this section, we derive equi-
libria under the assumption that players have threshold strategies, where types
below a certain threshold flee and types above that threshold fight. Intuitively,
stronger types have more to gain from fighting. We also assume that no type acts
after the period in which the strongest type acts. In Appendix A, we show that all
equilibrium profiles satisfy these properties.
Negative deterrence value: −vh < k < 0. In case of a negative deterrence value, the
payoff of winning a battle exceeds that of letting the other escape. In this case, there
is a unique equilibrium outcome in which all players fight or flee immediately. To
see this, note that very strong types will want to fight, and very weak types will
want to flee. If the weakest types would flee after t = 0, the strongest types have
an incentive to fight before that, to avoid that the opponent escapes. But then the
weakest types would deviate to fleeing earlier. This implies that the strongest types
fight immediately, and the weakest types flee immediately. Any other type will
then act immediately as well. Acting later is costly, because it does not result in
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fewer battles with stronger types that fight, and gives weaker types the possibility
to escape.
With all types acting immediately, let type ã be indifferent between fighting and
fleeing. The probability that the opponent of this type is weaker is ã. All stronger
types fight and all weaker types flee. Suppose type ã flees. If the opponent is weaker,
the expected payoff is (vh + k)/2. If the opponent is stronger, a battle results with
probability 1 − p and this will always be lost by type ã, giving a payoff −λvl . The
expected payoff of fleeing is therefore given by:
ã12(v
h + k) + (1− ã)(1− p)(−λvl). (2)
Suppose type ã fights. A weaker opponent escapes with probability p, giving a
payoff vh + k, and otherwise there is a battle that will be won by type ã, giving a
payoff vh. If the opponent is stronger, there will always be a battle that will be lost
by ã. The expected utility of fighting is then given by:
ã[p(vh + k) + (1− p)vh] + (1− ã)(−λvl). (3)





h + pλvl + k(p − 12 )
. (4)
Note that the threshold ã is increasing in the probability of an escape p. As p
increases, fighting against weaker types becomes less attractive since they become
more likely to escape. In that case, more types will flee in equilibrium. The effect
of an increase in k on ã depends on the value of p. For p < 12 , an increase in k has a
larger impact on the fleeing payoff than on the fighting payoff. This means fleeing
becomes more attractive, and more types will flee in equilibrium. For p > 12 , the
reverse is true.
Positive deterrence value: k > 0. With a positive deterrence value, players are better
off when the other manages to escape than when they win a battle. In this case,
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all the action will be concentrated in the final two periods of the game. Intuitively,
sufficiently strong players will wait until the last period, to give other players the
option to escape. Fighting should only take place in the last period. Weaker types
will then also prefer to wait until at least the penultimate period, since waiting until
then gives opponents the option to escape without the risk of ending up in a fight.
Consequently, for k > 0 there is a fraction of types that flees at T −1 and a fraction
of types that flees at T . The remaining fraction fights at T . Note that all types that
flee have the same payoff independent of the moment that they flee; they always
lose a battle with a type that fights and their payoff when the opponent flees is
independent of their fighting ability. The equilibrium does therefore not pin down
which types flee first, only the fraction. To determine the fraction of types that flee,
we can assume without loss of generality that the weakest types flee at T − 1. The
equilibrium can then be characterized by two threshold levels â1 and â2 > â1. Type
â1 is indifferent between fleeing at T − 1 and fleeing at T . Type â2 is indifferent
between fleeing at T and fighting at T . A fraction of types â1 flees at T − 1 and a
fraction of types â2− â1 flees at T . Types above â2 fight at T . The values of â1 and â2
are given by:
â1 =
λvl[(vh − k)(1− 2p)− 2kp2]





vh + k + 2(1− p)λvl
. (5)





For larger values of k, all types wait until the final period. Intuitively, if k is large,
it always pays off to wait and give others the option to escape, even if that implies
risking a battle with stronger types. The same is true for larger values of p. If
the probability of an escape is large, it becomes more attractive to wait, even if the
opponent fights.
The foregoing shows that there can be three types of equilibrium outcomes. If
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k < 0, there is a Rushing equilibrium in which all types immediately fight or flee. For
intermediate positive values of k, there is a Timing equilibrium in which some types
wait until the penultimate period and then flee, while all others wait until the final
period and then fight or flee. For high values of k, there is a Waiting equilibrium
in which all types wait until the last period and then fight or flee. While we de-
rived these equilibria under the assumption that players have threshold strategies,
in Appendix A we show that no other equilibria exist. The equilibrium outcome
is generically unique, except for k = 0 or k = k̂. The results are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium).
(i) If k < 0, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’Rushing equilibrium’ in which all
players act immediately. Players with abilities [0, ã] flee at t = 0 and players with abilities
(ã,1] fight at t = 0,
(ii) If 0 < k < k̂, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’Timing equilibrium’ in which a
fraction â1 of types flee in period T −1, a fraction â2− â1 of types flee in period T , and all
types above â2 fight in period T .
(iii) If k >max{k̂,0}, the unique equilibrium outcome is a ’Waiting equilibrium’ in which
types [0, ã] flee in period T and types (ã,1] fight in period T, and ã = 1 for any vh <
(1− 2p)k.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes for different combinations of the
probability of an escape (p) and the deterrence value (k). Figure 2 shows how the
threshold values change with k. For negative values of k, fewer types fight as k
increases. A higher k makes letting the other escape relatively more attractive, and
such an escape become less likely by fighting. This reverses for positive values of k,
with more types fighting as k increases. For higher values of k, fewer types flee early.
Fighting becomes relatively more attractive with more weaker types still around.










Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes with homogeneous loss
aversion. The solid brown dots indicate the experimentally










Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes with homogeneous loss aversion
and p < 12 . The dashed lines represent a decrease in the probabil-
ity of an escape (p). The dark-blue shaded area shows the waiting
equilbrium for the lower escape probability.
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To shed light on the question whether the dynamic time element of the Fight-
or-Flight game helps players to avoid costly battles, we use a static version of the
game as benchmark. In the static game, players choose simultaneously between
fight and flee, and the same payoffs result as when players reach the final period
of the dynamic game. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the static game coincides
with the equilibrium of the dynamic game for parameters where all players act in
the same period (that is, either case (i) or case (iii) described in Proposition 1).
An interesting feature of the timing equilibrium of the dynamic game is that
sorting takes place over time, resulting in fewer battles compared to what happens
in the static game. In the dynamic game, the strongest types remain in the game
until the last period, while some weaker types flee before any battle may take place.
Moreover, a smaller fraction of types will fight; fighting becomes less attractive with
fewer relatively weak players remaining.
Proposition 2 (Battles and sorting).
Compared to a static (simultaneous-move) version of the game:
(i) the frequency of battles is reduced in case of a timing equilibrium and the same in case
of a rushing or waiting equilibrium, and
(ii) the rate at which the weaker player in a pair manages to escape is increased in case of
a timing equilibrium and the same in case of a rushing or waiting equilibrium.
Notice that the choice for discrete time in our model has an advantage over using
continuous time. When the deterrence value is positive but not too large (as in part
(ii) of Proposition 1), the weakest types flee just before the end. In a continuous
time model, there would be no equilibrium for this case. The reason is that if the
weakest types with abilities [0, a∗1] flee in period T − ε, then any type in this interval
would like to deviate and flee in T − 1/2ε, however small ε is chosen.3
3The existence of a timing equilibrium can be restored by adding more possible actions to the
action space. For further arguments why discrete time can be more appropriate to model timing in
games, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Levin and Peck (2003).
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2.3 Extensions
In this section we discuss some extensions and relax some of the assumptions.
2.3.1 Heterogeneous loss aversion
A surprising feature of the analysis with a homogeneous population is that the set
of deterrence values for which the timing equilibrium materializes does not depend
on players’ loss aversion. This result changes when the population is heterogeneous
in the degree of loss aversion. Intuitively, players that are relatively averse to losses
will want to flee earlier. Indeed, a population that is heterogeneous in the degree of
loss aversion can sustain a timing equilibrium for a larger set of deterrence values.
We show this in a simple framework with two levels of loss aversion and we outline
the two main strategic features of this model.
Suppose that a fraction 1− q of the population has a loss aversion parameter λ1,
and a fraction q has λ2 > λ1. A player’s value of λ is private information but all
players know the distribution. Consider the case where q is very small. In that case,
the threshold levels derived assuming homogeneous loss aversion in Section 2.1 are
not much affected for the less loss averse types. Fix an equilibrium in which k > k̂,
so that all types with λ1 wait until period T . If λ2 is such that:
ã12(v
h + k) + (1− ã)(1− p)(−λ2vl) < 0, (7)
then types with λ2 and a fighting ability less than or equal to ã prefer to flee in
period T − 1 while types with λ1 prefer to wait until T . Thus, for the same level of
k, we now have a timing equilibrium instead of a waiting equilibrium.
Another feature of this model is that the more loss averse types will be the ones
who flee more frequently before the end. To see this, note that for the ability level
for which the less loss averse type is indifferent between fleeing in period T − 1
and period T , the more loss averse type still strictly prefers to flee in period T − 1.
The reason is that the expected payoff of fleeing in period T − 1 is not affected by
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the degree of loss aversion (since there are no negative payoffs), while the expected
payoff of fleeing in period T decreases in a player’s loss aversion (since the negative
payoff when a battle is lost weighs more heavily). In the experiment we will test
these two implications of the model with heterogeneous loss aversion.
2.3.2 Uncertainty in the likelihood of winning a battle
So far we simply assumed that the stronger player always wins a battle. In many
cases, there is some uncertainty and weaker players sometimes win battles too. A
natural case is one in which the likelihood of winning a battle increases in a player’s
relative ability compared to the opponent. For instance, the probability that i wins
a battle may be determined by:
eµai
eµai + eµaj
, µ > 0 (8)
so that stronger types are more likely to win, and types of similar fighting ability
have about equal chances of winning.
For large values of µ, such functions will yield the same qualitative results. That
is, with positive deterrence value, all the action will be concentrated in the final two
periods. The strongest types will still want to fight in the final period, while no type
will want to flee before the penultimate period. Likewise, with a negative deterrence
value, all types will still act immediately, provided the strongest types prefer to
fight. Naturally, the exact thresholds ã, â1, â2 and k̂ will depend on the specifics
of the winning function. Stronger types still have more to gain from fighting than
weaker types, but the difference decreases. This time, the equilibrium outcome does
not only pin down the fraction of types fleeing in the penultimate period, but also
the set of types. In the basic setup, all types below ã2 were certain to lose a battle
and therefore all had the same payoffs of fleeing and fighting. With a probabilistic
chance of losing a battle that depends on relative fighting ability, the weakest types
are most likely to lose a battle, and therefore they are the ones fleeing at T − 1.
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For small values of µ, other types of equilibria exist. As µ becomes small, there
is more randomness in which player wins a battle. In the extreme case, where µ ≈ 0,
each type has an almost equal chance of winning a battle against any other type. In
that case, there can be equilibria where all types prefer to fight (whenever 12(v
h −
λvl) > 0), possibly at different periods. There can also be an equilibrium in which
all types prefer to flee in the last period (when 12(v
h −λvl) < 0).
2.3.3 Cost of waiting
A variant that yields somewhat different predictions is the one where players face
the same known cost c for time. Here, it may happen that weak players decide to
drop out earlier than the penultimate period, as illustrated in the following exam-
ple. Consider the case in which T = 2, k = 10, p = 1/2, and λ = 1, while players incur
a waiting cost of c = 2 per period. Then it is straightforward to show that there is
an equilibrium where low types with abilities in the interval [0,2/25] do not wait
and flee immediately at t = 0, types in (2/25,1/5] flee at t = 1, types in (1/5,3/5] flee
at t = 2 while types in (3/5,1] fight at t = 2. Thus, with a cost of waiting, a more
gradual fleeing of types may be observed in equilibrium.
In the experiment, we focus on the variant of the game where time is not costly
for two reasons. First, it allows us to investigate in a meaningful way how the dy-
namic game helps players to avoid costly battles compared to the static game where
time plays no role. Second, we think that it is a stronger result if players use time as
a sorting device when time is not costly.
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 Design
Subjects participated in a laboratory experiment in which they played the Fight-or-
Flight game. In all treatments, we set the value of winning a battle to vh = 10 and
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Table 1: Overview of treatments
Treatment N subjects N matching groups
version deterrence value (k)
Dynamic -6 64 8
Dynamic 6 56 7
Dynamic 12 64 8
Static -6 56 7
Static 6 64 8
Static 12 56 7
losing a battle to −vl = −10. The probability of an escape when at the same time one
player decided to fight and the other decided to flee was set to p = 0.1. Each subject
played the game 40 rounds, with random rematching after every round within a
matching group of 8 subjects. At the start of each round, the subjects were informed
of their fighting ability for that round, which was an integer number from 0,1,2,...,
1000. They knew that each number was equally likely, that each subject faced the
same distribution and that draws were independent across subjects and rounds. At
the end of a round, each subject was informed of the outcome, the paired subject’s
fighting ability, and the resulting payoffs.
We implemented two treatment variations. The first treatment variable we var-
ied was the deterrence variable k, which was either -6, 6, or 12. The second treat-
ment variable concerned the dynamic or static nature of the Flight-or-Fight game.
This gives a 3x2 design. Every subject participated in only one of the treatments. In
total, 360 subjects participated, with 7 or 8 independent matching groups per treat-
ment. Table 1 presents an overview of the treatments and the number of subjects
per treatment.
In the dynamic Fight-or-Flight game, a 5 second countdown started after all sub-
jects in the laboratory had indicated that they were ready to start. This ensured that
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subjects knew exactly when the game would start. During the game itself, a clock
started counting down from 10 seconds to 0. The program divided the 10 seconds
in 50 periods of 200 milliseconds each. Subjects implemented their strategies in
real time. For instance a subject could decide to wait for 5 seconds (i.e., for the first
25 periods), and to then choose to fight which would then determine the outcome
of the game (unless the other subject had already terminated the game earlier). This
way she would implement the strategy (25,F). If subjects let the time run down to
0, they entered the endgame, in which they simultaneously decided between fight
and flee (with no time constraints, as they decided simultaneously anyway).
The static version of the game abstracted from the time element and only con-
sisted of the endgame of the dynamic version. That is, in this version of the game
subjects were immediately put in the same position as the players of the dynamic
game who had both decided to wait until the end of the game. So in the static game
both subjects simultaneously chose between fight and flee, and the outcomes and
payoffs were determined as described in the previous section.
After the main part, we obtained some additional measurements from the sub-
jects. We assessed subjects’ loss aversion with the method reported in Gächter, John-
son, and Herrmann (2007). In this method, a subject chooses whether to accept or
reject 6 different lotteries. In a lottery, the winning amount is 6 euros. The losing
amount varies across lotteries, from 2 till 7. In each lottery, the winning and the
losing amount are equally likely. If a subject rejects a lottery, she surely receives 0
euro. At the end of the experiment, 1 of the 6 lotteries is selected at random and
played out for actual payment. The number of rejected lotteries is our measure of a
subject’s degree of loss aversion.
We also measured physical strength. We asked subjects to press a hand dy-
namometer as hard as they could, following the procedure of Sell et al. (2009). This
measurement was obtained twice, and the best attempt was rewarded with 5 euro-
cents per kilo pushed. Finally, we obtained some self-reported (non-incentivized)
measurements on social dominance and prestige (taken from Cheng, Tracy, and
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Henrich (2010)), perceived masculinity, sex, and age.
This design allows us to investigate the predictions summarized in Propositions
1 and 2. In addition, it makes it possible to test the predictions from the behavioral
model of heterogeneous loss aversion.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was run at the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam.
The instructions can be found in Appendix D. Subjects read the computerized in-
structions at their own pace. They could only continue after correctly answering
some test questions at the end of the instructions. To facilitate understanding, we
used non-neutral labels such as ‘fight’ and ‘escape’. Subjects were informed that
the experiment consisted of two parts, and they received instructions at the start of
each part.
During the experiment, subjects earned points, where 1 point = e0.70 (≈ $0.84).
To avoid that subjects ended up with a net loss at the end of the experiment, they
received a starting capital of 21 points and knew that any profits or losses would be
added to or subtracted from this. There was no other show-up fee. At the end of the
experiment, one of the rounds of the main part was randomly selected for payment.
Total earnings averaged e19.09, ranging from e5.30 to e38.20. The duration of a
session was approximately 65-75 minutes.
4 Results
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we will first consider the testable predictions following
from Propositions 1and 2 respectively. Then, in subsection 4.3 we will turn to de-
cisions at the individual level. To be conservative, all statistical tests comparing
treatment differences use matching group averages as the independent unit of ob-
servation, unless indicated otherwise.
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4.1 Timing of actions
Following Proposition 1, we expect that the timing of actions is influenced by the
deterrence value. Specifically, we expect very quick decisions if the deterrence value
is negative and decisions in the final periods if the deterrence value is positive.
Figure 3 shows the average elapsed time before subjects made a decision in the
dynamic games. As predicted, we observe a clear effect of the deterrence value on
the timing of actions. With a negative deterrence value, subjects tend to fight or
flee almost immediately. On average, subjects make a decision after 273 ms. When
the deterrence value is positive, subjects tend to wait much longer. For k = 6, the
average elapsed time before making a decision is 3545 ms and for k = 12 this is
3973 ms. For both treatments with a positive deterrence value, the average waiting
time is significantly longer than for k = −6 (Mann-Whitney tests, p = 0.001, N = 15
for k = −6 vs k = 6 and p < 0.001, N = 16 for k = −6 vs k = 12). While subjects
wait slightly longer when k = 12 than with k = 6, the difference is not statistically
significant (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.908, N = 15 for k = 6 vs k = 12). For all
three treatments we observe learning effects. When the deterrence value is positive,
subjects learn to wait, reflected by the strong positive time trend over the rounds.
The reverse holds for the negative deterrence value. In this case, subjects decide
increasingly quicker. The average elapsed time is 402 ms in the first 10 rounds and
200 ms in the final 10 rounds.
Figure 4 gives a more detailed picture of the timing of decisions. The figure plots
the distribution of actions for each of the ten seconds plus the endgame (T). The left
panels show this for the first 20 rounds and the right panels for the final 20 rounds.
Several patterns emerge. First, with a negative deterrence value, we clearly observe
rushing: subjects decide almost immediately. None of the matches make it to the
endgame and 99.6 percent of all matches end in the first second. In fact, 91 percent
of all matches end within the very first 200 ms, i.e. in the first period.4



























Figure 3: Average waiting time (in ms) before subjects make
a decision in the dynamic game, by treatment and round.
Lines are moving averages of 3 rounds.
With a positive deterrence value, most action is at the very beginning and the
very end of the game: subjects tend to decide either relatively quickly or wait until
the final periods. With experience, i.e. in the final 20 rounds, a larger fraction of
subjects waits until the end of the game. Notice that this fraction might be under-
estimated, because a subject who is willing to wait until the end will only actually
reach the end of the game if the paired player is also willing to wait until then.
Among those waiting, there are some subjects that flee right before the endgame.
Result 1. When the deterrence value is negative, players act immediately. When the
deterrence value is positive, players are more likely to wait until the end of the game and
they learn to wait longer.
In contrast to theoretical predictions, we also observe subjects who move at the
very beginning of the game when the deterrence value is positive. The fraction of
subjects who move very early decreases over time, but even in the final 20 periods

















































































Figure 4: Distribution of decisions over time (seconds) by
deterrence value in the dynamic game. Period “T” indicates
the endgame. Left panels are for the first 20 rounds, right
panels are for the final 20 rounds. Only observations where
a player made a decision to fight or flee are included in the
graph, i.e. observations where a player was waiting when
the other moved are omitted.
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this finding when we discuss individual behavior in subsection 4.3.
4.2 Frequency of battles and sorting
The second main testable prediction -following from Proposition 2- is that endoge-
nous timing helps to avoid costly battles. Specifically, we expect fewer battles in
the dynamic games in case of a timing equilibrium, but not in case of a rushing or
waiting equilibrium. Figure 5 shows the frequency of battles for each of our treat-
ments. We do indeed observe fewer battles in the dynamic treatments compared
to the static treatments. The difference varies between 15-26 percentage points de-
pending on the deterrence value, and is always highly significant (p < 0.003 in each
case, two-sided Mann-Whitney tests). The regression analysis reported in column
(1) of Table 2 confirms that there are fewer battles in the dynamic treatments and
suggests that this effect is slightly stronger for the treatments with a positive deter-
rence value.
The reduction of battles for k = 6 is in line with Proposition 2: for k = 6 the
unique equilibrium outcome is a Timing equilibrium. The lower frequency of bat-
tles for k = 12 is not expected if players are homogeneous in their loss aversion, but
is consistent with our version of the model in which players differ in the degree of
loss aversion. In contrast to the theoretical predictions, we also observe a decrease
in battles when the deterrence value is negative. This result is, however, partly me-
chanical; even if all subjects wanted to act immediately, some subjects might be a
fraction of a second slower than others, resulting in more escapes.5
Also following Proposition 2, we expect that players sort themselves according
to their fighting ability in case of a timing equilibrium. The strongest players should
stay longer in the game than weaker players, giving weaker players the opportunity
5Of the 15 percentage point difference in battles between static and dynamic games when k = −6,
6 percentage points can be attributed to escapes that occur just because the subject who wanted to
fight is a fraction slower than the subject who wanted to flee. The remaining 9 percentage points can





















Figure 5: Fraction of battles by treatment. Error bars indi-
cate 95% confidence intervals, based on matching groups
as the independent unit of observation.
to escape. Hence, weaker players should manage to escape more frequently in the
dynamic games than the static games if the deterrence value is positive. Our results
are in line with this prediction. Figure 6 shows how often the weaker subject in a
pair manages to escape. We find that subjects sort on fighting ability more often
in the dynamic than the static game and the increase is larger for dynamic games
with a positive deterrence value. For k = −6, the weaker player escapes in 9% of the
matches in the static game and 16% of the matches in the dynamic game. For k = 6
(k = 12), we observe that the weaker player escapes in 11% (13%) of the matches in
the static game and 31% (34%) of the matches in the dynamic game. The diff-in-diff
analysis reported in Table 2 shows that the larger increase for positive deterrence
values is also statistically significant.6
6Figure 11 in Appendix C shows decision times for weak and strong players separately. It con-
firms the comparative static prediction that stronger subjects wait longer than weaker subjects if the
deterrence value is positive. Moreover, with experience subjects learn to wait longer, and this is true
for both weak and strong players.
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Table 2: Treatment differences in battles and sorting
(1) (2)
Battle occurs Weaker escapes
k = 6 -0.046 0.018
(0.039) (0.025)




k = 6 × Dynamic -0.073 0.128∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.036)






Notes: OLS regressions. Unit of observation is a matching group.
Dependent variable in column (1) is the fraction of battles and in
column (2) the fraction of matches where the weaker player in a
pair managed to escape. All independent variables are dummies.






























Figure 6: Fraction of times that the weaker player in a
pair escapes. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals,
based on matching groups as the independent unit of ob-
servation.
Result 2. There are fewer battles in the dynamic game than in the static game. The
dynamic version of the game helps players to sort themselves according to their fighting
ability, and this effect is stronger when the deterrence value is positive.
The reduced number of battles in the dynamic games also positively affects earn-
ings. Figure 7 shows the mean earnings for each treatment and for different levels
of fighting ability. As expected, stronger types attain higher earnings. Averaging
across all fighting abilities, earnings are higher in the dynamic games than in the
static games (Mann-Whitney tests, p < 0.003 for all three comparisons). Note that
the difference for k = −6 is much smaller than the differences for the treatments
with a positive deterrence value. Moreover, for k = −6 the difference is driven by











































































































































Figure 7: Mean earnings by treatment and fighting ability.
4.3 Individual behavior
We start this subsection by considering how actions in the dynamic games depend
on fighting ability. Figure 8 plots the fraction of subjects who flee or fight before
the endgame, those who were waiting while the other moved, and those who wait
until the endgame. We show this for the different deterrence values and for different
fighting ability levels (in 10 bins of equal size). In line with the results on decision
times discussed in subsection 4.1, no subject waits until the final period when the
deterrence value is negative. Only a few subjects (6 percent) are still waiting when
the other moves. When the deterrence value is positive, many subjects wait until the
endgame, or are waiting when the other moves. Combining those groups, we find
that 44 percent of subjects (intend to) wait for both k = 6 and k = 12. The differences
between the treatment with k = −6 and the other treatments is highly significant
(p < 0.001, two-sided χ2 tests). In line with theory, we find in all treatments that
weaker players are much more likely to flee and stronger players are much more
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Figure 8: Behavior before the final period in the dynamic
game, by deterrence value k and fighting ability a (in 10
bins of equal size). The category “wait” are subjects that
made it to the endgame. The category “other moves” are
subjects who did not make a move before the endgame but
the other subject did.
In the Appendix we provide further details on individual strategies. In Ap-
pendix B we estimate individual cutoff strategies. We find that most behavior is
consistent with the use of cutoff strategies: around 90 percent of all decisions are
captured by individual cutoff strategies. There is substantial heterogeneity in the
type of cutoff strategies that individuals employ.
In subsection 4.2 we reported that sorting was not only observed for k = 6 but
also for k = 12. This finding is consistent with the idea that heterogeneous loss aver-
sion enlarges the set of environments for which the timing equilibrium applies. A
more direct implication of heterogeneous loss aversion is that the more loss averse
players should flee early more often. Table 3 presents linear regressions of how the
probability of choosing to flee before the endgame (T ) depends on a subject’s inde-
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pendently measured level of loss aversion, together with some controls. In agree-
ment with the model of heterogeneous loss aversion, more loss averse subjects are
more likely to flee before the endgame when k = −6 and when k = 12, and the effect
survives when we combine all three treatments.
An anomaly is the fighting behavior early on in the game when there are benefits
of letting the other escape, i.e. when k > 0. In this case, fighting early is weakly
dominated. Given the observed actions in the experiment, the losses of fighting
early are substantial. Consider the strongest possible type who wins every fight.
This type would earn 14 percent higher expected payoffs by waiting to fight in the
endgame if k = 6 and 42 percent higher expected payoffs if k = 12. Note that fighting
early is even more costly for weaker types. One possible reason for why we observe
this anomalous behavior is that subjects may need some time to learn. As Figure 4
shows, we do indeed observe less of this behavior in the final 20 rounds compared
to the first 20 rounds. Another, more psychological, explanation for fighting early
on in the game might be a preference for social dominance. The evidence does
not support this. Table 4 shows that the survey measure of social dominance is
not a predictor of fighting early. We also do not find an association with physical
strength, but we do find that women are more likely to fight early than men.
The fact that we observe an approximately equal frequency of early battles when
k = 6 as when k = 12 suggests that this behavior is not due to a separate utility com-
ponent reflecting (for instance) a desire to control the outcome. If people have a
preference to decide the outcome, we would expect less early battles when it be-
comes more costly in k = 12. Instead, it may be that some of our subjects start
playing the game with a misguided behavioral rule that in contests it generally pays
off to strike first. Myerson (1991) proposes that behavior that is apparently subop-
timal behavior can sometimes be understood by assuming that observed behavior
is optimal in a related but more familiar environment, which he calls a ’salient per-
turbation’ (see Myerson (1991); Samuelson (2001); Jehiel (2005)). Alternatively, it
could be that intuition favors fighting behavior. According to the ’social heuristics
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Table 3: Fleeing before endgame
(1) (2) (3) (4)
k = −6 k = 6 k = 12 All k
Loss aversion 0.037∗∗∗ 0.001 0.041∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008)
Female -0.017 -0.006 0.023 0.005
(0.044) (0.077) (0.046) (0.031)
Dominance 0.000 -0.028 -0.005 -0.009
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.010)
Physical strength -0.007 -0.002 0.017 0.006
(0.023) (0.042) (0.023) (0.016)
Fighting ability -1.304∗∗∗ -0.976∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗ -1.108∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.014)
Round 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
k = 6 -0.137∗∗∗
(0.026)
k = 12 -0.110∗∗∗
(0.025)
Constant 1.006∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.056) (0.046) (0.029)
Observations 2520 2200 2560 7280
Notes: Linear random effects regressions, allowing for random effects at
both the matching group and the participant level. Dependent variable is
a dummy indicating whether the player decided to flee before the endgame
or not. Loss aversion is measured as the number of rejected lotteries. Dom-
inance and physical strength are normalized to mean zero and a standard
deviation of 1. Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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hypothesis’ (e.g., Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012); Rand et al. (2014)) applied to
our setting, if fighting is typically advantageous, it could become the intuitive re-
sponse. Note that subjects who fight early on have limited opportunities to learn,
since they never experience the benefits of waiting. This could explain why they do
not converge fully to waiting until the end of the game.
Result 3. The more loss averse players are the ones that more frequently flee early. A
sizable minority of players acts immediately when the deterrence value is positive. This
behavior decreases with experience. Anomalous early fighting is not associated with social
dominance or physical strength.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a dynamic Fight-or-Flight game that makes sense of a large
range of conflicts observed in practice. We highlight the crucial role that the deter-
rence value plays that players receive when the other player successfully escapes. If
it is negative, players will act in a split-second. When it is positive, players will be
patient and try to make the other player flee. An interesting feature of the analysis
is that if the deterrence value is positive but not too large, sorting will occur. That
is, the weakest players will flee just before the end, and thereby avoid costly bat-
tles. Thus, this paper clarifies how time can help people reach better outcomes in
dynamic games, even when time is not costly. The important role of the deterrence
value is confirmed in our experiment. Compared to a static version of the game,
players are better able to avoid costly battles.
In the experiment, we find support for a behavioral version of the model that al-
lows for heterogeneous loss aversion. In agreement with this model, sorting occurs
for a wider range of situations than predicted by the model with standard prefer-
ences. In addition, subjects who appear to be more loss averse in an independent
task tend to be the ones that more frequently flee early. We also observe an interest-
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Table 4: Fighting in the first second
All periods Final 20 periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0 k = 6 k = 12 all k > 0
Loss aversion -0.044∗∗ -0.001 -0.024 -0.028 -0.010 -0.019
(0.020) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016)
Female 0.129 0.031 0.071 0.174∗∗ 0.105 0.117∗∗
(0.091) (0.069) (0.055) (0.089) (0.072) (0.056)
Dominance 0.000 0.026 0.018 -0.010 0.024 0.010
(0.031) (0.022) (0.018) (0.030) (0.023) (0.018)
Physical strength 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.036 0.043 0.032
(0.051) (0.034) (0.028) (0.049) (0.036) (0.029)
Fighting ability 0.429∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.019) (0.014) (0.028) (0.021) (0.017)
Round -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
k = 12 -0.021 -0.032
(0.051) (0.052)
Constant 0.094 0.063 0.099∗ 0.025 0.015 0.047
(0.069) (0.069) (0.057) (0.084) (0.076) (0.063)
Observations 2200 2560 4760 1100 1280 2380
Notes: Linear random effects regressions, allowing for random effects at both the matching
group and the participant level. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the player
decided to fight in the first second or not. Loss aversion is measured as the number of rejected
lotteries. Dominance and physical strength are normalized to mean zero and a standard devi-
ation of 1. Fighting ability takes on values between 0 and 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors (clustered at the subject level) in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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ing anomaly. A fraction of the players choose to fight early even in situations where
the strategic incentive is to be patient. Our conjecture is that some subjects come to
the interaction with a homegrown notion that it generally pays off to strike early in
contests. Over time, this costly behavior diminishes but does not disappear.
We think that our setup provides a lower limit of the amount of sorting that
can be expected in practice. In our game, players manage to sort even though they
do not receive any sensory input about the ability of the opponent. In particular
when there is a strategic incentive to wait, sensory cues before or during the contest
may help players to avoid costly fights. In an actual display, body odor or a high
pitched voice may reveal fear and help identify the weaker player (Mujica-Parodi et
al. (2009), Sobin and Alpert (1999)). A dominant performance in a television show
by a candidate running for presidential office may convince a weaker opponent that
it is better to flee early. In the future, artificial intelligence may further help players
to agree on how they are ranked in terms of ability before they engage in a costly
battle. Relevant information about the opponent’s ability will also affect players’ de-
cisions when the deterrence value is negative. However, in such situations a positive
frequency of battles cannot be avoided. Even when information about the opponent
helps players to perfectly forecast who will win the fight, the stronger player will
still want to catch the weaker player in a battle.
Costly time is another aspect that will encourage a higher proportion of weak
types to flee before the end. Also, with costs of time sorting will unfold more grad-
ually, and the weakest types will already flee at the start. We think that extending




A Proofs of Propositions
Let St be the set of feasible actions for a player at time t < T . If no player decided
to fight or flee at any t′ < t, then St = {W,F,R}, otherwise St is null. ST = {F,R}.
Here, W indicates wait, F indicates fight, and R indicates flee (retreat). The game
ends with at least one player choosing F or R. A pure strategy is then a mapping
from each possible date t to St, conditional on the player’s type. To ease notation,
we denote a player’s strategy as si(ai) = (t,A), where A = {F,R}, meaning that player
i with ability ai will take an action (fight or flee) at time t if the other player did
not fight or flee before. In what follows, when we describe a strategy, we drop the
qualifier ”conditional on the other player not fleeing or fighting before.”
We first show that equilibrium strategies are monotonic, in the sense that if some
type prefers to fight at some point over fleeing at that or any other point, then all
stronger types also prefer to fight at some point over fleeing. Let Ṽi((t,A), ai , sj(aj))
be player i’s expected payoff of playing strategy (t,A) given his type ai and strategy
of the opponent (and distribution of possible types of the opponent).
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of Equilibrium Strategies). (i) If there is an equilibrium in
which there is a period t such that a player with type ai (strictly) prefers strategy (t,F)
to (t′,R) for any t′, then any player with type aj > ai (strictly) prefers (t,F) to (t′,R) for
any t′. (ii) Suppose there is an interval of types at = (a1, a2) that act in period t and let
ai , aj ∈ at. If there is a type ai that is indifferent between (t,F) and (t,R), then all types
aj > ai strictly prefer (t,F) to (t,R) and all types aj < ai strictly prefer (t,R) to (t,F).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider two types a′ and a′′ > a′. Suppose type a′ prefers (t,F)
for some t to (t′,R) for any t′. Then it must be that there exists a t such that for all t′,
∆(a′) ≡ Ṽi((t,F), a′, ·)− Ṽi((t′,R), a′, ·) ≥ 0. (9)
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Fighting in period t instead of fleeing in period t′ never decreases and may increase
the likelihood of ending up in a battle with types a ∈ (a′, a′′). Type a′ would lose such
a battle and type a′′ would win it. If the opponent has ability a < (a′, a′′), or if the
opponent is more likely to escape when the player fights (if t > t′ and the strategy of
the opponent is (t′′,R) for some t′ < t′′ < t) then ∆(·) is affected equally for types a′
and a′′. Thus, it is straightforward to show that for any a′′ > a′ and t̂ ∈ {t′, t′+1, ...,T },
∆(a′′)−∆(a′) ∝
∫
a∈(a′ ,a′′)|sj (aj )=(t̂,A)
g(a)da ≥ 0,
where g(a) is the density function. Using the above fact, equation (9) implies:
∆(a′′) = Ṽi((t,F), a
′′, ·)− Ṽi((t′,R), a′′, ·) ≥ 0. (10)
and the inequality in (10) is strict if either (9) holds with strict inequality or there is
a strictly positive mass of types acting at period t′ or after.
To show part (ii), note that in this case there is a strictly positive probability
of meeting an opponent with an ability between aj and ai , and ∆(aj) is therefore
strictly higher than ∆(ai).
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose −vh < k < 0. In this case, winning a battle yields a
higher payoff than letting the other escape. It is easy to see that there exists an ε > 0
such that all types on (1 − ε,1] strictly prefer (0,F) to (t,R) for any t. For ε → 0,
the likelihood of meeting a stronger type becomes arbitrarily small for types on
that interval, and they win all battles with weaker types. Thus, sufficiently strong
types will never flee. In any equilibrium, there must also be a positive fraction of
types with strategy (t,R) for some t. If this were not the case, then there exists an
ε > 0 such that all types on [0, ε) strictly prefer (0,R) to (t,F) for any t. For ε → 0,
the likelihood of meeting a stronger type becomes arbitrarily high for types on that
interval, and they lose all battles with stronger types. Thus, sufficiently weak types
would deviate to fleeing.
Now let t′ be the last period in which a positive fraction of types acts. Denote
this set by At′ = {ai |si = (t′,R) ∪ si = (t′,F)}, and let at′ = infAt′ and āt′ = supAt′ .
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In that period, there must be a positive fraction of types with (t′,R) and a positive
fraction of types with (t′,F). If there would be no positive fraction of types fleeing,
then for sufficiently small ε, all types on At′ ∩ [at′ , at′ + ε) strictly gain by deviating
to (t′,R): deviating to fleeing in that period strictly decreases the probability of a
battle which the sufficiently weak types in that set would almost surely lose. If
there would be no positive fraction of types fighting, then for sufficiently small ε,
all types on At′ ∩ (āt′ −ε, āt′ ] strictly gain by deviating to (t′,F): deviating to fighting
in that period strictly increases the probability of a battle which the sufficiently
strong types would almost surely win.
With a positive fraction of types that has strategy (t′,R), there cannot be a pe-
riod t < t′ in which a positive fraction of types has strategy (t,R). If there were such
a period (if there are more, let t be the last of those), then Lemma 1 implies that
types with strategy (t,R) must be weaker than types with strategy (t′,F). But then
types with strategy (t′,F) strictly gain by deviating to (t,F), since this will not af-
fect the outcome with other types that have strategy (t,F) and strictly decreases the
probability of an escape by types with strategy (t,R) (which are weaker).
It then follows that all types must act at t = 0. If there is some period t′ > 0 in
which a positive fraction of types flees, then all types that fight gain by deviating to
strategy (t,F) for some t < t′. Since in any equilibrium in which a positive fraction of
types has strategy (t′,R) there must also be a positive fraction of types with strategy
(t′,F), it must be that t′ = 0. The only equilibrium strategies are then (0,R) and
(0,F). Lemma 1 then implies that all types below a certain threshold flee, and types
above the threshold fight. The threshold is determined by equation (4) in the main
text. With these strategies, no player has an incentive to deviate. The equilibrium
payoffs for types ai < ã are ã12(v
h + k) + (1 − ã)(1 − p)(−λvl). Fleeing or fighting in
some period t > 0 would yield payoffs ã(vh + k) + (1− ã)(−λvl). No player deviates if
ã ≤ pλvl/[12(v
h + k) + pλvl]. Substituting for ã, we find that this is always satisfied.
Types aj > ã clearly have no incentive to deviate to acting later. Acting later does
not change the outcomes with other types that fight and increases the likelihood of
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the weaker types escaping. Finally, no type wishes to deviate to another strategy at
t = 0. The difference in payoffs between fighting and fleeing (∆) is strictly increasing
for types ai < ã (∂∆/∂ai = ã(1− p)(vh +λvl)) and strictly increasing for ã < aj for any
p > 0 and constant for p = 0 (∂∆/∂aj = (1 − ã)p(vh + λvl)). Thus, if ã is indifferent,
then all weaker types strictly prefer to flee and all stronger types (weakly) prefer to
fight.
The equilibrium exists for 0 < ã < 1. It is straightforward to verify that this is the
case for any −vh < k < 0.
Consider next the case with 0 < k < k̂. In this case, letting the other escape yields
a higher payoff than winning a battle. In equilibrium there has to be a positive
fraction of types that for some t prefers (t,R) to (t′,F) for any t′. If this were not the
case, and no positive fraction flees at some point, then for sufficiently small ε > 0,
all types on [0, ε) strictly gain by fleeing at t = 0: this would strictly increase the
probability of an escape and they almost surely lose a battle for ε sufficiently small.
We next show that all types will act in the last two periods. Let t′ be the last
period in which a positive fraction flees. The strongest types strictly prefer to wait
until after t′, if such a period exists. It cannot be that a positive fraction fights after
t′, however. If there would be a set of types Af fighting after t′, with a = infAf ,
then for ε > 0 sufficiently small, types onAf ∩ [a,a+ε) would strictly gain by fleeing
in some period after t′. Thus, it must be the case that the strongest types wait until
T , and at least some of the types acting in period T will flee. It is easy to see that
no type will then fight before T : fighting later does not change the outcome against
other types that fight, and gives weaker types the option to escape. It is then also
easy to see that no type will act before T − 1: if a positive fraction of types would
act before T − 1, they would strictly gain from waiting until T − 1, since no types
fight at T −1. Lemma 1 implies that if some types fight at T , then all stronger types
must fight too. Any equilibrium can therefore be characterized by the thresholds in
equation (5) in the main text.
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Under these strategies, no type gains from deviating. All types [0, â2] have the
same equilibrium payoff (â1 12(v
h+k) > 0) and are indifferent between (T −1,R), (T ,R)
and (T ,F). If they would flee before T − 1 they would earn 0. Fighting earlier is
strictly dominated for type â2 since it would give weaker types no option to escape,
and therefore also for any weaker type. Types (â2,1] earn more under strategy (T ,F)
than under strategy (T ,R), and they also do not want to act earlier, as it would give
weaker types no option to escape.
The equilibrium exists if 0 < â1 < â2 < 1. That 0 < ã2 < 1 is clear from the
restrictions on k. After some rewriting, one can show that â1 < â2 if k < vh, which
always holds for this case as from equation (6) it follows that k < k̂ < vh.
Finally, consider the case with k > k̂. The analysis is identical to the case for
0 < k < k̂, except that ã1 is negative. This means that all types like to act at T .
Weak types flee and strong types fight, where the threshold is determined as ã as in
equation (4). Note that for k(1 − 2p) > vh, all types prefer to flee in equilibrium, so
we set ã = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i). In a simultaneous move game, the threshold type is
determined by ã. For the rushing and waiting equilibrium, this coincides with the
threshold type in the dynamic game and the frequency of battles must be the same
in the dynamic and the static games. For the timing equilibrium, a battle occurs
when a player with ai > â2 either meets another player with aj > â2 or another player
with aj ∈ (â1, â2) who does not manage to escape. This means that the frequency of
battles in the timing equilibrium is given by f btiming = (1−â2)
2+2(1−â2)(â2−â1)(1−p).
In the static game, a battle occurs if two types with ai > ã meet, or when a type with
ai > ã meets a type with aj ≤ ã and the weaker type does not manage to escape. This
is, the frequency of battles in the static game is given by f bstatic = (1− ã)
2 +2(1− ã)ã(1−
p). A sufficient condition for fewer battles to occur in the timing equilibrium than
in the static game (i.e. for f bstatic > f
b
timing to hold) is that ã < â2 holds. This requires
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that k < k̂ ≡ 1−2p1−2p+2p2v
h, which is satisfied whenever a timing equilibrium exists.
Part (ii) In the static game, the weaker player in a pair manages to escape with
frequency f sstatic = ã
(
ã12 + (1− ã)p
)
+(1−ã) (ãp). In the dynamic games, this frequency
is the same in case of a rushing or waiting equilibrium. In case of a timing equi-









â1 + (â2 − â1)12 + (1− â2)p
)
+(1− â2) (â1 + (â2 − â1)p). In the
proof of part (i), we showed that if a timing equilibrium exists, it must be that ã < â2.




2 + (1− â2)p
)
+ (1− â2) (â2p) and a sufficient condition
for f stiming > f
s






2 + (1− â2)p
)
+ (1− â2) (â2p) to hold. Rewriting
yields that this holds as long as â1+â2+(1−â2)2p < 2, which is satisfied as in a timing
equilibrium we have that â1 < â2 < 1 and p ≤ 12 .
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B Individual cutoffs (for online publication)
In this appendix, we estimate cutoff strategies at the individual level. We use a grid
search (with intervals of 2 ‘fighting ability points’) to find a combination of cutoffs
that maximizes the number of accurately classified observed actions. In the exercise,
we assume the following cutoff strategies. For each individual, we estimate three
cutoffs c1, c2 and c3, where 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 ≤ 1000. Figure 9 shows the assumed cut-
off strategies. We assume that individuals fight before the endgame if they draw a
fighting ability ai < c1, they wait until the endgame and then flee if c1 ≤ ai ≤ c2, they
wait until the endgame and then fight if c2 < ai ≤ c3 and fight before the endgame if
c3 < ai . These assumptions nest the risk-neutral equilibrium cutoff strategies. More-
over, the assumed cutoff strategies are in line with how subjects (on average) base
their actions on their fighting ability (see Figure 8).
Figure 9: Assumed cutoffs strategies for the empirical
model.
Figure 10 shows the estimated cutoffs c1 and c3. Note that below c1 subjects
should flee before the endgame, between c1 and c3 they wait until the endgame, and
above c3 they fight before the endgame. This means that those in the top-left cor-
ner (c1, c3) = (0,1000) always wait until the endgame, those in the top-right corner
(c1, c3) = (1000,1000) always flee before the endgame and those in the bottom-left
corner (c1, c3) = (0,0) always fight before the endgame. Those on the 45 degree line
c1 = c3 never wait until the endgame.
The left panel of Figure 10 shows the estimates for k = −6. In this case, rushing
is predicted and under risk neutrality c1 = c3 ≈ 119. Qualitatively, the results are
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Figure 10: Estimated individual cutoffs based on the final
20 rounds. Open circles represent individual estimates, the
solid (orange) circle represents the theoretical prediction
assuming risk neutrality.
c1 ≈ c3 as most circles lie on the 45 degree line or very close to it. In contrast to
the risk neutral prediction, most estimated cutoffs lie somewhat higher on the 45
degree line than predicted, meaning that subjects flee more often. Of course, this is
in line with subjects being loss averse or risk-averse.
The middle and right panel of Figure 10 show the estimates for positive deter-
rence values. In these cases, fighting before the endgame is weakly dominated and
c3 = 1000 in equilibrium. In line with these predictions, we see that most estimates
lie close to c3 = 1000. There is some heterogeneity though. For some subjects, the
estimates lie on the 45 degree line, indicating that those subjects never wait until
the endgame. For 21 percent of the subjects in k = 6 we estimate c1 = c3 while this
is 16 percent for k = 12.
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. Besides the estimated average in-
dividual cutoffs, the table also lists what fraction of observed actions are correctly
classified by the estimated cutoff strategies. The cutoff strategies capture observed
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Table 5: Estimated cutoffs
Treatment Mean cutoff Correctly classified c1 = c3
c1 c2 c3
Dynamic k = −6 393 393 444 0.96 0.78
Dynamic k = 6 256 359 750 0.88 0.21
Dynamic k = 12 304 430 780 0.88 0.16
behavior very well: between 88 and 96 percent of all actions are correctly classified.
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Figure 11: Average waiting time (in ms) before subjects
make a decision in the dynamic game, by treatment, type
and round. 3-round moving average. Strong types have


































































































Figure 12: Distribution of decisions over time periods by
deterrence value in the dynamic game. Each period is a
200 ms interval, period “T” is the endgame. First, third
and fifth panel are for the first 20 rounds, second, fourth
and sixt panel are for the final 20 rounds.
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D Instructions (for online publication)
The experimental instructions are reproduced below. All treatment dependent text
is given in italics, preceded by the relevant treatment variable(s) between braces. In
the quiz questions, all numbers (strengths, seconds) were generated randomly for
each subject.
Welcome!
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. Please read the following in-
structions carefully. You will also receive a handout with a summary. If you have
any questions at any time, please raise your hand. An experimenter will assist you
privately.
Today’s experiment consists of 2 parts. At the beginning of each part, you will
receive new instructions. You will spend most time on the first part. Your decisions
in one part have no influence on the proceedings or earnings of the other part.
Your decisions and those of other participants will determine your earnings.
Your earnings will be paid to you privately at the end of today’s session. All your
earnings will be denoted in points.
At the end of the experiment, each point that you earned will be exchanged for
70 eurocents.
You will be given a starting capital of 21 points. Any profits or losses you make
today will be added to or subtracted from this starting capital.
Part 1: Decisions and Payoffs
This part consists of 40 rounds. In each round you will be randomly paired
with another participant in the laboratory. Therefore, in each round you will (most
likely) be paired with a different participant than in the previous round. You will
never learn with whom you are paired. At the end of the experiment, one of the
rounds of Part 1 will be randomly selected for payment. Your earnings for Part 1
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will be completely determined by what happened in this round.
Description of the situation and possible earnings
In each round, there is a prize of 10 points to get for one of you. If a Fight occurs
between you and the other participant, the strongest participant will earn the prize
of 10 points and the weaker participant will lose 10 points.
{k = −6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a par-
ticipant manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees
him- or herself 0 points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her
strength). The participant that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10
points minus a cost of 6 points because he or she let the other get away (thus earning 4
points in total).
{k = 6} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a participant
manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees him- or
herself 0 points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her strength).
The participant that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10 points plus
an additional 6 points because he or she did not have to fight for the prize (thus earning
16 in total).
{k = 12} Each of you can also try to avoid a fight by attempting to flight. If a par-
ticipant manages to flight, there is No Fight, and the participant who flights guarantees
him- or herself 0 points (instead of winning or losing 10 points depending on his or her
strength). The participant that did not flight then automatically receives the prize of 10
points plus an additional 12 points because he or she did not have to fight for the prize
(thus earning 22 in total).
{dynamic, k = −6} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly deter-
mined who wins the prize at a cost and who flights. So one of you will earn 4 points and
the other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
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{dynamic, k = 6} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly determined
who wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 16
points and the other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{dynamic, k = 12} If both of you flight at the same time, it will be randomly deter-
mined who wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will
earn 22 points and the other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = −6} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize at a cost and who flights. So one of you will earn 4 points and the other
will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = 6} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 16 points
and the other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
{static, k = 12} If both of you attempt to flight, it will be randomly determined who
wins the prize together with the bonus and who flights. So one of you will earn 22 points
and the other will earn 0 points, and each possibility is equally likely.
When will a fight occur?
{dynamic} In each round, there will be a clock that counts down from 10 seconds to
0. At any point during this countdown, you and the other participant have the option to
choose fight or flight. You have also the option to wait and thereby postpone your decision.
The computer checks every fifth of a second if a decision has been made by one or both of
you.
{static} In each round, you and the other participant have the option to choose fight
or flight. You will make this decision simultaneously with the other participant, without
knowing what the other participant chooses.
{dynamic} If both of you decided to fight, or one of you decided to fight while the other
is still waiting to make a decision, a Fight occurs.
{static} If both of you decided to fight, a Fight occurs.
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{dynamic} If both of you decided to flight, or one of you decided to flight while the
other is still waiting to make a decision, there is No Fight.
{static} If both of you decided to flight, there is No Fight.
{dynamic} If one of you decided to flight at the same time that the other decided to
fight, a fight occurs 90% of the time. In the other 10% of the time, the person deciding to
flight manages to avoid a fight. So on average, the person that attempts to flight will get
away 1 out of 10 times that you end up in such a scenario.
{static} If one of you decided to flight and the other decided to fight, a fight occurs
90% of the time. In the other 10% of the time, the person deciding to flight manages to
avoid a fight. So on average, the person that attempts to flight will get away 1 out of 10
times that you end up in such a scenario.
The possible scenarios are illustrated in the figure below.
{dynamic}
{static}
{dynamic}What will happen if both of you waited until 10 seconds have passed?
{dynamic} It is possible that after 10 seconds none of you has made a decision to fight
or flight. In that case, you are forced to make a decision to fight or flight. You will make
this decision simultaneously with the other participant, without knowing what the other
participant chooses. Your decision together with the decision of the other participant will
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then determine whether or not a Fight occurs, according to the same rules as above.
Part 1: Strength and Information
Strength
At the start of each round, each participant will be informed of her or his strength
in that round.
• A participant’s strength will be a random number between 0 and 1000 (0 and
1000 are also possible). Each of these numbers is equally likely.
• In each round, every participant is assigned a new (and independent) strength.
Therefore, the different participants (most likely) have different strengths in
a round, and the same participant (most likely) has different strengths across
rounds.
• At the start of a round, each participant is only informed about her or his own
strength.
• It is very unlikely that both players have the same strength, but if this happens
it will be randomly determined who is the stronger player.
Information at the end of a round
At the end of a round, each participant will be informed of the outcome, the
other participant’s strength and the resulting payoffs.
On the next screen you will be asked to answer some control questions. Please
answer these questions now.
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Decision screen
Below you can test how the decision screen works. You can do this by clicking
on ”show example” below. You can do this as many times as you like by clicking
on ”show example” again. If you understand the screen, click on ”go to practice
questions” to continue.
Practice questions
Please answer the following questions:
In each round, you are matched with:
The same participant
A randomly determined participant
In each round, your strength is:
The same
Randomly determined
The following decisions are imaginary and do not indicate what you should do
in the experiment. The numbers are randomly drawn.
Consider a round in which your strength is 889 and the other has a strength of
181.
{dynamic} You choose Fight after 7 seconds, before the other makes a decision.
{static} You choose Fight, the other chooses Flight. The other does not manage to
get away, so a FIGHT occurs.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? points
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How much would the other earn? points
Consider a round in which your strength is 889 and the other has a strength of
181.
{dynamic} The other chooses Flight after 7 seconds, before you make a decision.
{static} You choose Fight, the other chooses Flight. The other manages to get away,
so there is NO FIGHT.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? points
How much would the other earn? points
Consider a round in which your strength is 912 and the other has a strength of
130.
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make
a decision simultaneously. You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. You do not
manage to get away, so a FIGHT occurs.
{static} You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. You do not manage to get away,
so a FIGHT occurs.
If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? points
How much would the other earn? points
Consider a round in which your strength is 912 and the other has a strength of
130.
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make
a decision simultaneously. Both of you choose Flight, so there is NO FIGHT. It is
randomly determined that you are the one who wins the prize without a Fight.
{static} Both of you choose Flight, so there is NO FIGHT. It is randomly determined
that you are the one who wins the prize without a Fight.
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If this round is selected for payment:
How much would you earn? points
How much would the other earn? points
{dynamic} Both of you don’t make a decision within 10 seconds. You have to make
a decision simultaneously. You choose Flight, the other chooses Fight. What is the
chance that you can get away?




You have reached the end of the instructions. You can still go back by using the
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